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Abstract 
This paper proposes a set of critical questions to guide reflections on persuasive systems. The 
questions are mainly based on value-based practical reasoning as suggested in argumentation 
research. Value based reasoning is involved in any persuasive design discourse to assess the 
purposiveness, goodness or rightness of system actions to be designed. In this approach, the critical 
questions are structured according to practical discourses suggested by Habermas (1993) in order to 
help focusing on, and guiding, pragmatic, ethical, and moral discourses of 
persuasive system design and use. This paper contributes to the current research by enriching 
reflective methods with a set of concrete questions which can in particular be employed for a value 
sensitive participatory design of persuasive systems. This article is conceptual-theoretical by its 
nature. It illustrates the applicability of the approach by employing it to analyze a commercial web-
based persuasive system. 
Keywords: Critical questions, critical design, value-based practical reasoning, discourse ethics, 
motivation, value sensitive design, user participation 
 
1 Introduction 
Persuasive Systems are designed to change a person’s attitude or behaviour or both, without using 
coercion or deception (Fogg, 2003). For example, Amazon.com persuades people to purchase more 
books or other products whereas Classmates.com persuades people to provide personal information. 
The web, mobile, and other ambient technologies created opportunities for persuasive interaction for 
several motives, including persuading people to behave in socially-valued ways (e.g. save energy, quit 
smoking), by giving information, providing feedback, and taking over actions. Previous literature has 
suggested some principles and guidelines for designing and evaluating persuasive systems (e.g., Fogg, 
2003, 2009; Oinas-Kukkonen & Harjumaa, 2009). In addition, explicit attention has been paid to 
ethical aspects, in particular with respect to the motives of the designer, the methods of persuasion 
employed in the system, and the intended and unintended outcomes of the persuasion (e.g., 
Berdichevsky & Neuenschwander, 1999; Fogg, 2003, Verbeek, 2006). These valuable suggestions of 
concepts and principles can guide designers and help to minimize harmful consequences. Yet, there 
are some open issues and challenges, which have been only partly addressed within the discourse of 
the persuasive systems research community. Two of them are of particular importance for the purpose 
of this paper. 
First, the principles and guidelines are mainly designer-centred and concerned with reflections in the 
design time of a persuasive system, expecting from design teams to reflect and anticipate future use 
situations and consequences of persuasion. For example, two principles proposed by Berdichevsky and 
Neuenschwander (1999) state (1) that creators of technology should not seek to persuade others of 
something they would not be persuaded of themselves and (b) that the creators of persuasive 
technology must anticipate and assume responsibility for all “reasonably predictable” outcomes. These 
principles are in line with Kant’s Categorical Imperative that expects from an individual (e.g, a 
designer) to reason about the universalizability of his or her maxims, while suggesting what to do. In 
contrast, Habermas (1993, 1996) argued in his work on discourse ethics that the diversity of interest 
and value orientations requires the involvement of all those affected in a decision for what is good or 
acceptable for them. In fact, user-centred approaches to persuasive systems are concerned with the 
involvement of users, yet, mainly for the evaluation of usability and persuasive effectiveness and not 
for addressing ethical issues. An exception is the work of Davis (2009, 2010), arguing for the 
participatory and value sensitive design methods to account for the ethical implications of persuasive 
systems. From the perspective of discourse ethics, such a participatory approach is promising while it 
would actively engage all stakeholders in the design process, involve reflection on the stakeholders’ 
values and negotiations, and thus promote social learning. However, the current literature on 
persuasive system design lacks specific guidance on how to structure the participatory process to deal 
with ethical issues, that is, to allow a systematic way to reflect on what is good or bad about the 
motives, methods and outcomes of the persuasion. More precisely: What questions should or could be 
asked in design discourses to deal with the diversity of values, goals, and methods? 
Second, involving stakeholders in a participatory design process is helpful (Klein & Hirschheim, 
1994; Chatterjee et al., 2009), yet it does not guarantee the effectiveness and appropriateness of a 
persuasive system in future use situations, since participants of the design process cannot anticipate or 
envision all future use situations or evaluate the consequences and acceptability of actions for all. This 
is partly due to the practical constraints such as the limits of participants involved, the available design 
knowledge, emerging users and use contexts, as well as value changes. Hence, approaches to 
persuasive systems require methods for involving end users (e.g. non-participants of design process) in 
use time, in order to enable them to articulate unmet needs, to criticize and change recommended 
actions, goals and underlying values set by the participants of the design time, when they are viewed 
as inefficient, inappropriate or unethical (Yetim, 2010, 2011b). 
In fact, in the field of Information Systems (IS), proposals for both problems mentioned exist, even 
though they have not been applied to persuasive systems yet. Based on Habermas’s works, several 
participatory and discursive methods have been suggested to involve those affected in design to deal 
with the diversity of values and norms (e.g., Klein & Hirschheim, 2004; Yetim, 2006, 2011b; Mingers 
& Walsham, 2010). Moreover, a discourse support tool has been developed, which provides a set of 
critical questions and discourses for enabling continuous discourse in design and use time (e.g., Yetim, 
2008). When integrated in the user interface of a persuasive system, the tool would allow to critically 
assess the comprehensibility of communicated signs, the efficiency, effectiveness, and appropriateness 
of recommended actions or persuasion strategies, goals, and outcomes. Nevertheless, many of the 
issues suggested by discursive approaches are abstract, and there is a need for more fine-grained 
questions, in order to provide designers and users of persuasive systems with a set of discourse-
specific critical heuristics. 
To support reasoning about persuasive systems, this paper proposes a rich set of critical questions 
which are mainly based on the concept of value-based practical reasoning as considered in 
argumentation research (Atkinson et al, 2006; Walton et al., 2008). An interesting aspect of 
considering argumentation is that it clarifies different assumptions behind an argument and also 
provides a list of critical questions to challenge them. Value based reasoning is involved in any 
persuasive design discourse to reflect on purposiveness, goodness or rightness of system actions to be 
designed. Habermas’s (1993) three practical discourses focus on these general issues to address them 
in an argumentative way. Therefore, the approach uses the practical discourses to structure the richer 
set of critical questions derived from a value-based argumentation. As a result this paper provides 
value sensitive designers and users with a list of critical questions which can be used as heuristics in 
design discourses as well as in use time to reflect and challenge the implicit or explicit value 
assumptions, goals or actions of a system. This paper contributes to the current research by enriching 
current reflective or discursive methods with a set of concrete questions which can be useful for the 
value sensitive participatory design of persuasive systems. This article is conceptual-theoretical by its 
nature. Yet, it illustrates the applicability of the proposed framework by employing it to analyze a 
commercial web-based persuasive system. 
In the following, we will first describe the theoretical foundations, then present the proposed 
framework for critical heuristics, and finally, illustrate its application with the help of an example. 
2 Theoretical Foundations 
2.1 Practical Reasoning and Practical Discourses 
Practical reason is the general human capacity for resolving, through reflection, the question of what 
one is to do (http://plato.stanford.edu). In contrast to theoretical reason, which deals with the truth of 
propositions, practical reason is concerned with the desirability or value of actions. In practical 
reasoning people assess and weigh their reasons for and against alternative courses of action.  
In his discourse ethics, Habermas (1993) distinguishes between pragmatic, ethical and moral 
employments of practical reason and three types of practical discourses, i.e., pragmatic, ethical and 
moral discourses. The idea is that in practical situations the question of what one is to do can take on 
pragmatic, ethical, and moral meaning, requiring different kinds of answers for justifying choices 
among alternative available courses of action. This question can have a pragmatic task in view (e.g., 
designing a persuasive interface), and reflections in pragmatic discourse seek reasons for a rational 
choice of means in the light of fixed goals, or of rational assessments of goals in the light of existing 
value preferences. When values underlying the goals or actions themselves become problematic, the 
question of what one is to do points beyond the purposive rationality and requires value decisions in 
ethical discourse. This discourse involves reflections on the self-understanding of a person or a 
community, i.e., on what is good for one self or for a cultural community. Finally, in case of value 
conflicts between cultural communities, the question of what one is to do calls for a reflection in moral 
discourses to seek what is “equally good for all”, that is, a moral discourse seeks justice for all through 
the generalization across conflicting societal or cultural interests and value orientations. 
The relevance of discourse ethics to IS research has already been articulated (e.g., Yetim, 2006; 
Mingers & Walsham 2010). Based on Habermas’s works, Yetim (2006) suggested a complex 
discourse model consisting of many other discourse types and he also implemented them in a 
discourse support tool (Yetim, 2008). In fact, all these discourses are relevant for the design of 
persuasive systems and can promote reflections on different issues in a systematic way. Yet, this paper 
focuses on three practical discourses which deal with ethical aspects and the justification of choices of 
values, goals, and actions. The discourses will serve as a general framework for seeking the choice of 
the purposive (pragmatic), the good (ethical) and the just (moral). Each of these discourses can involve 
other sub issues and arguments. The approach proposed is based on the assumption that providing 
explicit support by means of critical questions is better than leaving them implicit. One of the useful 
sources for finding fine grained critical questions to support the deliberation in these discourses is the 
research on argumentation, in particular, the research on argument schemes and value-based practical 
reasoning. 
2.2 Argumentation Schemes and Value-Based Practical Reasoning 
Walton et al. (2008) regard practical reasoning as a species of presumptive argument. For example, the 
simplest form of practical reasoning is the means-end reasoning which is an argument with two 
premises and a conclusion of the form: “I have a goal G. Carrying out this action A is a means to 
realize G. Therefore, I ought (practically speaking) to carry out this action A”. Given an argument 
like this, we have a presumptive reason for performing the action. This presumption can be 
challenged. Subjecting the arguments to appropriate challenges allows us to consider the alternatives 
and to determine the best choice for us. Walton et al. (2008) describes a set of other forms of 
reasoning such as the argument from consequences and the argument from values. These forms of 
reasoning are called argumentation schemes. Each argument scheme captures a stereotypical pattern of 
human reasoning and is associated with a set of critical questions. The basic method of analyzing and 
evaluating an argument is to use the critical questions associated with the argument scheme. 
Design discourses of persuasive systems can involve different forms of arguments, including an 
argument from consequences or an argument from values, since the assessment of persuasion goals, 
methods, or intended and unintended outcomes of a specific design features as good or bad involves 
value judgments. Thus value-based argumentation is of particular relevance here. How it works and 
relates to practical reasoning is well explained in (Atkinson et al., 2006, Walton et al., 2008). In 
particular they show that arguments from values can be combined with practical reasoning to build an 
argumentation scheme that is called value-based practical reasoning. There are two different but 
interrelated suggestions for the scheme and associated critical questions, as summarized in Table 1. 
Atkinson et al. (2006) critically reviewed an earlier work of D. Walton, who had five critical 
questions, and suggested an elaborated set of sixteen critical questions. The recent scheme described in 
Walton et al. (2008) involves seven critical questions. In contrast to Walton et al., Atkinson et al. 
employ an argument scheme which makes the factual context explicit. Nevertheless, the critical 
questions are interrelated and some of them are reformulations or variants. One important difference 
concerns the fact that Atkinson et al. (2006) distinguish between three elements: states, goals and 
values. In their model they define states to be a set of propositions about the world to which we can 
assign a truth value, goals are propositional formulae on this set of propositions, and values are 
functions on goals. The distinction between goals and states allows representing the difference 
between effects of actions which the agent wishes to attain, and the effects which follow from an 
action but are not necessarily desired by the agent. They view values as being distinct from goals and 
not just sub or super goals. Values provide the actual reasons for which an agent wishes to achieve a 
goal. Two people may agree upon a goal to be achieved, but their reasons may be very different due to 
their contrasting value sets. In a persuasion dialog, the questions provide different ways to attack the 
goals, the proposal of an action for each goal, or the values promoted. For example, concerning the 
schema used by Atkinson et al., (2006), the proponent can question the premises (i.e., the four 
statements of the general scheme) (#1 - #4), explore alternative ways to satisfy the same desired value 
(#5 - #7), consider the side effects of the action (#8 - #10) and the interference with other actions (#11) 
as well as explore the possibility of an element of the scheme (#12-16). 
In the following section, we explore the relation of these questions to practical discourses. 
 
Scheme used by Walton et al. (2008) Scheme used by Atkinson et al. (2006) 
Premise 1: I have a goal G. 
Premise 2: G is supported by my set of 
values,V. 
Premise 3: Bringing about A is necessary (or 
sufficient) for me to bring about G. 
Conclusion: Therefore, I should (practically 
ought to) bring about A. 
In the circumstances R 
we should perform action A 
to achieve new circumstances S 
which will realise some goal G 
which will promote some value V. 
Critical questions: 
1. What other goals do I have that might 
conflict with G? 
2. How well is G supported by (or at least 
consistent with) my values V? 
3. What alternative actions to my bringing 
about A that would also bring about G should 
be considered? 
4. Among bringing about A and these 
alternative actions, which is arguably the best 
of the whole set, in light of considerations of 
efficiency in bringing about G? 
5. Among bringing about A and these 
alternative actions, which is arguably the best 
of the whole set, in light of my values V? 
6. What grounds are there for arguing that it is 
practically possible for me to bring about A? 
7. What consequences of my bringing about A 
that might have even greater negative value 
than the positive value of G should be taken 
into account? 
 
 
Critical questions: 
1. Are the believed circumstances R true? 
2. Has the action A the stated consequences S? 
3. Will the action A bring about the desired 
goal G? 
4. Does goal G realise the value intended? 
5. Are there alternative ways of realising the 
same consequences? 
6. Are there alternative ways of realising the 
same goal? 
7. Are there alternative ways of promoting the 
same value? 
8. Does doing action A have a side effect which 
demotes the value V? 
9. Does doing action A have a side effect which 
demotes some other value? 
10. Would doing action A promote some other 
value? 
11. Does doing action A preclude some other 
action which would promote some other 
value? 
12. Is it possible to do action A? 
13. Are the believed circumstances R possible? 
14. Is the situation S believed by agent a to 
result from doing action A a possible state of 
affairs? 
15. Are the particular aspects of situation S 
represented by G possible? 
16. Is the value proposed is indeed a legitimate 
value? 
Table 1. Value-based practical reasoning scheme and critical questions 
 
3 A Framework for Critical Heuristics 
Using three practical discourses as a general structure we will discuss in this section how the critical 
questions from Table 1 can be regrouped according to the purposes of three discourses and mapped to 
them, in order to support critical reflections within each discourse.  
For mapping the questions, we have first considered the main concerns of each discourse (i.e., the 
purposive, the good, and the just) and eliminated from Table 1 those questions suggested by Atkinson 
et al. (2006) that refer to whether a state of affairs exists (i.e., #1, #13, #14, #15). These questions 
require other types of sub-dialogues such as the theoretical discourses or empirical investigations in 
the discourse model (Yetim, 2006). Second, we identified a similarity between both lists of critical 
questions and either used one of them or renamed them (e.g., #3 and #6 suggested by Walton et al., 
considered similar to #6 #12 suggested by Atkinson et al.). Third, we have also added some other 
questions suggested by Yetim (2006, 2008), in particular for dealing with moral aspects. Finally, we 
considered two different usage purposes for each discourse to further differentiate between questions 
and to build subcategories within each discourse. Each discourse can involve discussions for finding 
the best solutions (i.e., identifying what is purposive, good, or just) or for critically assessing the 
conformance of a decision with previously agreed values or norms (i.e., testing whether something is 
purposive, good, or just). Following Habermas (1996), Yetim (2006, 2011b) argued that design 
discourses involve iterations between three discourses and the results of pragmatic discourse should be 
compatible with values accepted in ethical discourse, and the results of both pragmatic and ethical 
discourses should not violate moral norms agreed upon. Therefore, for grouping the critical questions 
in each discourse, we distinguish between the identifying mode for creatively finding new ideas, values 
or norms, and the checking mode for testing the conformance of the results.  
Table 2 presents the arrangement of critical questions in each discourse. Pragmatic discourse includes 
questions that deal with the identifying and checking of goals in relation to desired or legitimated 
values and of actions in relation to both goals and values. In this discourse participants may first check 
whether the value is a legitimate value, that is, agreed upon in an ethical discourse where the reflection 
on and the choice of values takes place. Then, they may propose alternative ways to satisfy the desired 
value, check whether a chosen action or goal is in accord with the desired value, reflect on side effects 
of the action, the interference with other actions, etc. Alternatively, they may start with setting goals 
and actions, without making the underlying values explicit. When value issues and conflicts emerge 
during a dialogue, then participants can enter ethical discourses. The basic pragmatic or purposive 
questions about the best ways to achieve particular goals may be more complex than described here. 
The resolution of conflicts may require information, expertise, and other resources. 
An ethical discourse involves questions to identify values by reflecting on and rationally choosing 
value preferences as well as assessing whether the result of the pragmatic discourse (i.e., the choice of 
goals and action) are in line with the values preferred, i.e., whether doing the action is in accord with 
one’s values or existential identity and self-understanding. Accordingly, actors may first start with an 
ethical discourse to identify values worth considering in design and then enter into a pragmatic 
discourse to discuss how to realize them. Alternatively, they may enter an ethical discourse after the 
pragmatic discourse to resolve value conflicts or to check results of the pragmatic discourse. Ethical 
reflections on values may not lead to a consensus or several values may be worth promoting, so that 
there may be a need of preference ordering. 
Moral discourse includes questions that help to identify the norm in case of value conflicts and 
critically asses the conformance of the results of the pragmatic and ethical discourse with accepted 
norms. The identification of the norm or regulation that is just or good for all requires the suggestion 
of regulation/norm and reflection on the consequences of the suggested norms for the value orientation 
of those affected by the norm. The critical questions help to guide the moral reflection and to shift the 
process of moral reflection from the individual designer to all relevant stakeholders. 
 
Discourse 
types 
Questions 
Pragmatic 
Discourse For both Identifying & Checking 
Goal‐Value 
1. Is the value proposed indeed a legitimate value? 
2. How well is G supported by (or at least consistent with) the value? 
3. Are there other goals considered that might conflict with G? 
4. Are there alternative goals to promote the same value 
Action‐Goal 
5. Is it possible to do action A? 
6. Will the action A bring about the desired goal G? 
7. Are there alternative ways of realizing the same goal? 
Action‐Value 
8. Does doing action A have a side effect which demotes the value intended? 
9. Does doing action A have a side effect which demotes some other value? 
10. Does doing action A preclude some other action which would promote some 
other value? 
Ethical 
Discourse  Identifying 
11. How is value V understood/defined? 
12. Is value V worth promoting? 
13. Are there other values that conflict with value V? 
Checking 
14. Do the goals considered promote or violate values preferred? 
15. Do the actions considered promote or violate values preferred? 
Moral 
Discourse Identifying 
16. Has a norm/regulation negative consequences for my (our) value 
orientation? 
17. Is a diverse regulation good for all (or just)? 
18. Are there alternative ways of regulation (norm) that could be good for all 
given value conflicts? 
Checking 
19. Are the values promoted in accord with norms? 
20. Are the goals to be achieved in accord with norms? 
21. Are the actions to be taken in accord with  norms? 
Table 2. Practical discourses and related critical questions 
Before closing this section, we should note that the answers to each question may lead to 
disagreements such as disagreements about the assumed link between goals and values, about the 
appropriateness of actions and goals, about the effects of actions, about the conformance of actions 
with values and norms etc., which require a resolution. In addition, the resolution of some questions 
such as the comprehensibility of actions or factual disagreements may require other discourse types. 
Moreover, the questions suggested in this paper are not meant to be complete. Design deliberations 
involve also other forms of arguments and there are other critical issues, as described in (Walton et al., 
2008), as well as other types of discourses, as described in (Yetim, 2006) 
4 The Applicability of the Framework 
There are different options to apply the framework. One option is the discursive use of it in design 
discourses, in which participants can employ the critical questions to evaluate the arguments or 
positions of others. The design decisions resulting from such discourses can also be documented and 
communicated along the critical questions, that is, in a template that justifies choices of values, goals, 
and actions and serves as a document for value-focused design rationale. This would allow for a 
transparent and rational communication in the design process in general, and in the design process of 
persuasive systems, in particular. Even though design participants may not have satisfying answers to 
each question in design discourses, having the explicit list may create an awareness of important 
aspects and enforce participants to think about them. In fact, there are several discourse support tools 
that allow mapping such questions for using them in design meetings (see for example, tools described 
in Conklin, 2005; Yetim, 2008). 
Another option is to use the set of critical issues for the analytical evaluation of any system designed, 
of the user interface of a system or design documents. This can be done in a discursive (in teams) or 
extra-discursive way such as an evaluation by an individual expert or the feedback of an individual 
user during the use. In this section, we will demonstrate the applicability of the suggested framework 
through the extra-discursive evaluation of a contemporary commercial system, namely, The Nike+ 
system (http://nikerunning.nike.com). The Nike+ system supports the organization and participation of 
the running activities and incorporates several distinct persuasive techniques in its functionality. This 
system is chosen because it has been also used by other authors (Oinas-Kukkonen & Harjumaa, 2009) 
to illustrate the feasibility of a conceptual model for the design and evaluation of persuasive systems. 
It is, therefore, of particular interest to see how the same system responds to our issues which have not 
been considered in the previous research so far. 
With respect to pragmatic aspects, we can critically evaluate whether the system clearly communicates 
goals and also provides reasons for why the goals are considered as good, in order to motivate users to 
achieve the goals. In addition, we may critically ask whether the system clearly communicates what to 
do to achieve the goals and also explains why a proposed action is better than other available actions. 
 
Figure 1. Showing goals and explaining the value of achieving the goal. 
As shown in Figure 1 (left), the Nike+ system offers users different options which have been 
categorized according to the runner’s goals, e.g., “run more often,” “run farther,” “burn calories,” “run 
faster,” or “set coach program.” Moreover, the system also motivates users by making the value of the 
achievement of each goal explicit, i.e., it provides reasons for why achieving the goal is good. This is 
activated when a user hovers the cursor over a goal, for example, over the goal “burn calories”, as 
shown in figure 1 (right). The system makes the value of this goal explicit by stating “Sweat off a few 
pounds by setting this goal.”  
Certainly, values can be good reason for motivation. If users do not consider the value worth 
promoting, the goal will be less motivating. Moreover, users may not agree that the achievement of the 
goal would realize the stated value. Further critical questions can be asked such as how the goal is 
achieved, i.e., what should be done, which is explained in the detailed descriptions of the goals. 
What is important here is the issue of whether the system allows users to provide a feedback or to 
challenge the values. As shown in Figure 2 (left), the computer-human dialogue is supported by a 
feedback mechanism, a feedback panel, which users can activate to provide ideas, questions, describe 
problems and articulate what they liked or valued. In addition the system offers a forum for 
discussions. Moreover, the user can evaluate the whole running program using personalized feedback, 
as shown in Figure 2 (right). These mechanisms enable users to articulate which actions were good or 
bad. In this way they may influence the choice of values, goals, and actions. 
 
Figure 2. Enabling users to provide feedback on what they do or do not value. 
With respect to the moral questions, i.e., the right norm, there is no other mechanism than the 
aforementioned feedback mechanism or forum to be used. As the forum does not restrict the kinds of 
questions to be asked, users can use the forum to ask pragmatic, ethical, and moral questions as well as 
to articulate their values and the consequences of actions for their own value orientations.  
All in all, the analytical evaluation of this system demonstrates the practicability of the theoretical 
framework of critical questions, which allows us to claim that they are useful for improving the 
persuasive qualities of the systems. 
5 Conclusion 
Previous literature has already emphasized that the success of persuasive systems depends on the 
integration of sound technology, effective persuasive principles and careful attention to ethical 
considerations. This paper suggested a set of critical questions that can be used both in design 
discourses as well as in use situations to critically asses the values, goals, and actions of a system. The 
illustration of the applicability of the framework by means of a persuasive system indicates that the 
suggested concepts can be useful and enrich the repertoire of concepts suggested in previous research 
to guide the design and evaluation of persuasive systems.  
The suggested questions by no means cover all the useful questions that one can ask to improve the 
persuasive qualities of a system. Future research can investigate additional questions for promoting 
reflections in the context of persuasive system design. In addition, experimental work will be needed 
to demonstrate the framework’s applicability in various real-life design and usage situations. It is of 
particular interest to investigate whether differentiating issues along the discourse will be practical or 
whether the discourses can be organized as workshops in a participatory design to involve different 
types of participants in different discourses. For example, design experts may participate in a 
pragmatic discourse whereas all those affected can articulate their values or moral understanding in an 
ethical and moral discourse. 
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